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The increased cost and sophistication of military
aircraft require detailed procurement planning and financial
management. This thesis will consider three factors which
affect the procurement of Navy Aircraft and then relate these
factors to an actual program— the CH-53 Heavy Assault Helicopter,
The study was undertaken because of the personal interest on
the part of the author as a Naval Aviator for eleven years
and because of the increased sophistication, employment and
cost of military helicopters during that period.
In 1960, the production of military helicopters of all
services totaled 494, annual production increased until 1967
when production was 2,448 (see Table 1). Because of security
limitations, the production figures for the years 1968 and
1969 are not available, however, programmed production figures
for the years 19 70 and 19 71 have been added to Table 1 to
illustrate that a peak was reached during or after 1967 and
that production has declined annually since then.

TABLE 1
PRODUCTION OF MILITARY HELICOPTERS
Year Total Air Force Navy Army
1960 494 57 147 284
1961 366 42 187 137
1962 624 33 208 313
1963 762 45 165 462
1964 1099 34 145 828
1965 1488 60 195 1215
1966 2242 80 253 1831
1967 2448 73 279 2096








tion of America, Washington, D.C. (New York:
Aviation Week & Space Technology, McGraw-Hill,
1970)
,
p. 34; years 1970-1971 obtained from
Department of Defense, OASD , Comptroller
(Press Package), 2 February, 1970.
The Navy figures in Table 1 include Marine Corps
Helicopters and these comprise the total of assault helicopters
procured by the Navy for the Marine Corps.
These figures on Table 1 are shown to illustrate that a
peak has been reached in terms of procurement funding to meet
a threat (South East Asia). Though the threat seems to have
diminished to some degree, the change does not relieve the
Department of Defense or the Navy of responsibility for

developing viable weapons systems to meet an ever-changing
security threat. The problem of developing and purchasing
modern weapon systems is expensive and continuous because of
the explosive technological climate existing in and out of the
United States. To compound the problem there is the recent
decrease in annual Defense Appropriations which further limits
the procurement capability of the military departments. This
trend prompted Mr. Robert C. Moot, Assistant Secretary of
Defense ( Comptroller ) , to state that "Defense spending no longer
dominates total Government spending. " He goes on to say that
Defense spending in the 19 71 Budget is seven per cent of the
Gross National Product and about 34.6% of the total Federal
Budget.
Addressing the Defense portion of the Federal Budget
still further, he poses the guestion about returning to pre-
VietNam spending levels and states it should not be done:
The reason is guite simple; pay and price increases
since 1964 have eaten up $16 billion of the $21
billion added to the Defense Budget since then. In
real terms— that is dollars of constant buying power,
our budget for FY 71 is only $5 billion or 7.5%
higher than the prewar level of 1964. 2
Though Defense spending has been on the downward trend
since 1968, and there is still a great deal of public and
Address delivered at the Naval War College entitled,
"Defense Spending Myths and Realities," quoted in the Naval
War College Review
,







Congressional pressure to decrease it even more, it does not
relieve DOD of the responsibility of maintaining national
security— a part of this responsibility is developing a
weapons inventory capable of meeting ever-changing security
3
threats. For this reason, it appears that the successful
weapon system of the future will be the one that includes the
most effective and efficient procurement procedures.
The question of Naval Aircraft Procurement can be
confusing if the many contributing departments are mentioned
and no relationships are shown between them. To simplify
matters, a brief review of the chain of command from the
Secretary of Defense (SecDef) down to the Project Manager in
the Naval Air Systems Command (NavAir) is outlined to give the
reader some perspective and understanding of the various
relationships. This review has been included in the Intro-
duction because of its relative importance throughout the study.
The requirement for a weapon system begins to take shape
in the Planning Phase of what is called the Planning,
Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS). During this phase,
plans are developed and objectives of the military departments
of DOD are analyzed to determine what is needed to counter a
possible security threat. Based upon this planning, the








in the Programming Phase where it is made the part of a Program
Objective. It is here that total numbers, characteristics,
etc. , are formulated and the actual procurement is effected.
Throughout Planning and Programming, it is necessary to expend
funds and this is taken care of by the Budgeting Process.
For the past ten years PPBS has been the means by which
DOD directed the entire Defense Effort , therefore it plays a
key role in the development and procurement of any weapon
system in DOD. Any major revisions to PPBS directly affect
the procurement process—because of this condition, Chapter II
will review the most recent PPBS revisions and analyze possible
future revisions of the Navy Budgeting Process.
The second factor affecting procurement is Contracting
and Chapter III will list the most frequently used contracts
in their previous order of DOD preference and will cite the
advantages and disadvantages of each. Procedures used in the
process of acquiring major weapon systems are then discussed
to reflect the changed attitudes of DOD in terms of contracting
and procurement. The purpose of the chapter is to define
previous DOD contract preference, identify important changes
that have occurred under Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary
Packard since their appointments, and to compare the recent
changes with the recommendations of an earlier independent
study.

Defense Contracting is a very complicated and diverse
area, for this reason the scope of the chapter will be limited
to those contracts utilized in helicopter procurement. The
chapter is intended to illustrate basic DOD policy in
contracting and to serve as the basis from which a comparison
with an actual contract can be made in Chapter IV.
Factors external to PPBS and Contracting will be
discussed in Chapter IV. The purpose here is to compare the
procedures described in Chapters II and III with an actual
procurement program to see what changes occur that are beyond
the scope of each procedure . The planning, programming, etc.,
and contracting procedures discussed appeared to be directed
towards making the procurement process more effective and
efficient. These efforts are sometimes helped or hindered
by uncontrollable external factors—their effect will be shown
relative to the acquisition of the CH-53 Assault Helicopter.
Chapter V will summarize the important points of each
chapter, analyze their importance in the procurement process
and enumerate the conclusions of the study.
The Chain of Command
The Department of Defense (DOD) organizational structure
is shown in Figure 1. A large and complicated organization of
this nature must be broken down into smaller elements and
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8and working relationships. After the Secretary, Mr. Laird and
his Deputy, Mr. Packard, the next level in DOD is the Assistant
Secretary level. At this level, the Assistant Secretaries of
Defense ( Comptroller , Systems Analysis, Installations and Logis-
tics, and Research and Engineering) would be the four most
involved with procurement and budgeting.
Going from the Staff to the Line area at the same level,
the military departments and defense agencies are listed. The
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is shown and this is made up of the
military heads of the services.
The Department of the Navy (Figures 1 and 2) differs
basically from the other military departments in that it
encompasses two distinct, though closely related, military
services— the Navy under the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
and the Marine Corps under its Commandant (CMC). The Office
of the CNO (Figure 3) has within it several key divisions:
(a) DCNO(Air) who is the program sponsor for aircraft, (b) The
Director of Navy Program Planning and (c) DCNO(Plans and Policy).
Each of these play important roles in the procurement process.
Both CNO and CMC have command and funding responsibility
for their respective military operations, which include budget
formulation and execution related to those appropriations
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the staff offices. A list of the Appropriations is shown on
the Table below:
TABLE 2
APPROPRIATION BUDGET STRUCTURE (NAVY)
Research, Development, Test and Evaluation
Procurement of Aircraft and Missiles, Navy




Operations and Maintenance (Navy and Marine Corps)
Military Personnel (Navy and Marine Corps)
Reserve Personnel (Navy and Marine Corps)
Source: The Programming System
,
Navy Department
Planning and Management Systems Course, Navy
Logistics Management School, Washington, D.C.,
1970, p. 96.
The Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial
Management) (ASN(FM)) is designated as Comptroller of the Navy
(NAVCOMPT) and is responsible for overall coordination of
budget and fiscal matters related to Navy and Marine Corps
programs. The principle subordinate in the budget process
4
"The Chief of Navy Material is responsible for meeting
the material requirements of the Navy and is also responsible
for meeting the particular material support needs of the
Marine Corps." Quoted from "Budget Process in the Department
of the Navy," Armed Forces Comptroller , April, 1969, p. 33.




within NAVCOMPT is the Director of Budget and Reports in the
Office of the Comptroller of the Navy (Budget ) (NCB) , who with
his staff perform most of the functions as a responsibility of
NAVCOMPT—under the supervision of the Comptroller and Deputy
Comptroller.
Because this study deals mainly with aircraft procure-
ment, only two Appropriations will be discussed—Research,
Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) and Procurement of
Aircraft and Missiles, Navy (PAMN). RDT&E is administered by
the Assistant Secretary of the Navy ( Research and Development)
ASN(R&D) with the aid and assistance of CNO and the Chief of
Naval Material (CNM) of which the Naval Air Systems Command
(NavAir) is a part. The PAMN Appropriation is the responsi-
bility of the Naval Air Systems Command.
Figure 4 identifies the units within the Naval Material
Command (NMC). Because of the specialized nature of the
reports, etc., which emanate from the Commands in NMC to the
CNO level and because of the relationship that exists between
program sponsor at CNO and project manager at NavAir, an
informal line of communications is established which often
bypasses the chain through NMC Headquarters. The result of
this situation is that often times formal reports are submitted
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level— in terms of many budgets and reports NMC acts as a
5
"rubber stamp" in transporting the documents.
Figures 5 and 6 show the Naval Air Systems Command and
its Assistant Commanders. The 01 block is the division that
contains the Naval Coordinated Project Of fices (APC-255 )— this
is where the Assault Helicopter Office is located. The Deputy
Commander for Plans and Programs, and Comptroller administers
the RDT&E and PAMN Budgets and is responsible for the PAMN
Appropriation
.
The working relationships within the NavAir 01 area are
shown on Figure 6. The point is that for Assault Helicopters
(or all Navy Helicopters for that matter) there is no
designated Project Manager— all come under the Naval Coordinated
Project Offices and managers working on specific helicopters are
called Deputy Project Coordinators.
5
Study of the Accounting System of the Department of
the Navy, Haskins & Sells, Certified Public Accountants,
Washington, D.C. Report number NOO600-70-C-0565 , published
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CURRENT PPBS REVISIONS IN DOD
The Planning, Programming and Budgeting System began
in the Department of Defense (DOD) in 1961. Whether it came
2
about because of Congressional pressure, the growing complexity
of Defense spending, the slow evolution suggested by
Senator Jackson when he traced program budgeting "... back
at least to President Taft's Commission on Economy and
Efficiency, which published, 'The Need for a National Budget, 1
3in 1912," or even the impact of one man, the then Secretary
of Defense (SecDef), Robert S. McNamara, its present existence
There are many sources which document this fact. One of
the more concise was found to be the unpublished MBA thesis of
Thomas R. Stuart, "The Impact of Budgeting Reforms and Their
Historical Relationship to Planning, Programming, Budgeting
in the Department of Defense" (George Washington University, Navy
Financial Management Program, 1970), chapter iv, pp. 50-70.
2Charles J. Hitch, Decision-Making for Defense
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1965),
pp. 26-27.
3
U.S., Congress, Senate, Planning-Programming-Budgeting ,
Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security and
International Operations of the Committee on Government Opera-
tions, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Part 1, 23 August, 1967, p. 12.






is the important fact. This chapter will review the most
recent changes in PPBS and relate them to the Navy form of
DOD PPBS.
The revisions were the result of a Defense Management
Conference held in May, 1969. It was attended by the new DOD
presidential appointees of the Nixon Administration which
came into office in January, 1969. The conference was aimed
at " . . . improving the DOD top-level decision-making
4
process." The meshing of the recommendations of this
conference, plus a Pentagon staff effort earlier the same year
to simplify PPBS procedures, resulted in the revision to DOD
Instruction 7045.7, entitled "The Planning, Programming, and
Budgeting System. " This is being used as the procedural basis
for preparation of the FY 72-76 Defense Program and the FY 72
5
Budget.
The stated aim of the conference pinpointed a basic
problem area of PPB that developed in the years 1961 through
1967— in the words of the Jackson Subcommittee this was a
period of "Greater centralization of decision-making and
control." The opinion of observers during this period who had
4Laurence E. Olewine, "PPBS in Defense for the







Planning- Programming-Budge ting Hearings, p. 14.

19
direct dealings with the Defense Department Staff was that
decisions were made by the Secretary of Defense and his staff
without regard to the advice of the heads of the military
7
services, namely the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). This fact
was brought out on more than one occasion. A case in point was
the F-lll which was not recommended by the JCS as an appro-
priate weapons system, but which the SecDef directed
acquisition of anyway. Other problems that arose during this
period because of centralized decision-making and control were
Skybolt and "... a $277 million oil-fueled aircraft carrier
o
that was obsolete before it was launched, " to name just a few.
The latter pointed to another weak area in the old PPBS and
this was the lack of fiscal guidance in the early phases of
the Planning portion of the system.
Perhaps the greatest difference and the one that resulted
in the May, 1969, conference and subsequent PPBS revisions was
the greater participative characteristic of the newly appointed
7Opinions obtained through interviews with the following:
Mr. Claude Witze, senior editor of Air Force and Space Digest
and DOD observer for twenty years; Mr. Edward Speck, economist
and PAMN Appropriation Budget Analyst for the Comptroller of
the Navy for eight years; Mr. Thomas Jefferies, Deputy Project
Coordinator for Helicopters, Naval Air Systems Command.




DOD staff. This point was made at a recent lecture by RADM
Moore when he stated that Secretary Laird was much more of a
participative manager than his once-removed successor,
10
Robert S. McNamara. The participative approach can be seen
throughout the revisions because the revisions themselves are
directed towards more involvement on the part of all concerned
to determine the best force mix and resource allocation to
meet the security needs of the nation.
In the revision, four new documents have been added and
three have been deleted. These are shown below:
Documents Added
Strategic Guidance Memorandum (SGM)
Fiscal Guidance Memorandum (FGM)
Joint Force Memorandum (JFM)
Program Objective Memorandum (POM)
Documents Deleted
Draft Presidential Memorandums (DPM)
Major Program Memorandums (MPM)
Defense Guidance Memorandums (DGM)
9 Steven Lazarus, Commander, USN, "Defense PPBS—
A




Lecture by RADM S. H. Moore, Director of Budget
and Reports, Comptroller of the Navy Office, given to Navy
Financial Management Program Class of 1971, George Washington
University on 16 November, 19 70.
Navy Logistics Management School, Navy Department
Planning and Management Systems Course, The Programming
System (Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 118.

.21
The complete PPB Cycle is shown in Figure 7. The Roman
numerals which indicate key points on the figure will be
referenced in the following discussion of the cycle and
changes thereto.
Planning
The cycle begins with the Joint Strategic Objectives
Plan-I (JSOP-I) which is shown as numeral I on Figure 7. It
is developed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and is the
first of a three part plan. JSOP-I provides the advice of JCS
to the President and SecDef on such matters as military
strategy, force objectives and other associated recommenda-
tions for attaining the national security objective of the
United States. The purpose of the plan, which covers two to
ten years, is to provide a JCS statement of the national
security objective and the military objectives derived there-
12from. Another document prepared by JCS for SecDef is the
Joint Research and Development Objective Document (JRDOD)
which provides advice concerning research and development
objectives necessary to carry out the recommendations of the
jsop. 13
12U.S., Department of Defense, Instruction Number
7045.7, "The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System,"
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The Navy planning input to JSOP is through the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) who is a member of JCS. It is based
upon various studies the most important of which is the Navy
Strategic Study (NSS) and its annexes A and B. Annex A deals
with mid-range strategic guidance and projects qualitative
force and research and development guidance for the five-year
period commencing five years after the end of the fiscal year
in which approved. Annex B accomplishes the same except it is
for long-range planning and guidance, hence it is for the ten-
year period commencing ten years after the end of the fiscal
year in which approved. The NSS and annexes summarize the
Navy's roles and tasks. Mid-range and long-range objectives
are developed based upon the complete NSS and on further
studies and analyses of the prospective naval task requirements,
14
threats, technological potentials and resource availability.
This forms the basis for the Navy planning input to JSOP-I.
Referring again to Figure 7, the JSOP-I is sent to the
SecDef for review and to the services for planning. After the
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) review, a tentative
Strategic Guidance Memorandum (SGM) is developed and sent to
JCS for comment. Since this new document is based on JSOP-I,
it incorporates much of the Plan, but also reflects any
Navy Programming Manual, OPNAV 90P-1C, January, 1969,
pp. 3-2 and 3-3.

24
modifications or additional strategy guidance deemed necessary
by the SecDef. Once the Strategic Guidance Memorandum (SGM)
has been reviewed by JCS and their comments considered, the
SecDef issues a revised SGM (numeral II on Figure 7) to JCS,
the military departments and defense agencies early in January.
The goal of the issuance of the revised SGM is to provide
current and completely coordinated strategy guidance for the
entire defense community.
A chart for processing PPBS documents within the Navy
is shown in Figure 8 and will be used throughout the discus-
sion to clarify the flow of documents and to categorize the
steps shown in Figure 7 into their appropriate PPBS phases.
After the SGM has been distributed, the second new
PPBS document is issued and this is the tentative Fiscal
Guidance Memorandum (FGM) (numeral III). A major departure
from the old PPB and a significant revision in its own right,
the purpose for it is made quite clear in the order:
Annually, the SecDef will issue tentative five year
guidance to define the total financial constraints
within which the DOD force structure will be developed
and reviewed . . . SecDef will specify in the FGM the
nature of the fiscal planning constraints, and the
assumptions used in its preparation.
"
Introducing fiscal constraints near the beginning of the
PPB Cycle forces consideration by everyone concerned of
15DODINST 7045.7, pp. 6-7.

Source
Fig. 8.—Flow Chart for
Processing PPBS Documents within the
Department of the Navy.
U.S. Department of the Navy, Policy, Roles and Responsi-
bilities within the Department of the Navy for Imple-
mentation of the DOD Planning, Programming and Budgeting
System (PPBS). Secretary of the Navy Instruction
5000. 16D, 8 January, 1970.

26
alternatives and priorities throughout the entire process. The
effect of this document on the Navy is shown in Figure 8 by the
review of both CNO and CMC and subsequent approval by the
Secretary of the Navy (SecNav) and submission to SecDef.
During the period when tentative fiscal guidance is
being reviewed by the military departments and agencies, JCS is
completing the JSOP-II (numeral IV in Figure 7). This is the
force structure portion of JSOP and provides recommendations,
as well as the associated rationale, on forces needed to meet
the strategy guidance. It is significant to note that as in
the old PPB Cycle, JSOP-II is prepared without regard to
specific financial constraints.
Receipt by SecDef of the JSOP-II from JCS and the
tentative fiscal guidance review from JCS and the services
concludes the Planning Phase (V). As shown in Figures 7 and 8,
the publication of JSOP-II and the Fiscal Guidance Memorandum
initiate the next PPBS Phase— Programming.
Programming
Programming in the PPBS Cycle is the process of trans-
lating force and support requirements into manpower and
material resource requirements. It is based on the Five Year
-1 c
Defense Program (FYDP) which is structured as follows:
A Managers Guide to the Acquisit ion of POD Systems






II General Purpose Forces
III Intelligence and Communications
IV Airlift and Sealift
V Reserve and Guard Forces
VI Research and Development
VII Central Supply and Maintenance
VIII Training, Medical and Other
IX Administration and Associated Activities
Support of Other Nations
Source: Navy Logistics Management School, Navy Department
Planning and Management Systems Course, The
Programming System (Washington, D.C., 19 70),
p. 95.
The FYDP is the summation of the approved programs of
all DOD components and consists of resource inputs and
military outputs. A basic unit of the FYDP is the Program
Element which is defined as:
defines FYDP as follows: An eight-year projection of forces
and a five-year projection of costs and manpower arranged in
mission-oriented program packages. The FYDP projects approved
programs for the current fiscal year, the base year, and the
succeeding four fiscal years. Changes to the FYDP program
which result in changes of forces, total obligational authority,
or personnel assignments to individual programs are made by
submitting a Program Change Request (PCR). LMI Task 68-13,
Washington, D.C., January, 1969, p. 22.

28
A description of a mission by the identification of
the organizational entities and resources needed to
perform the assigned mission. Resources consist of
forces, manpower, material quantities, and costs,
as applicable . 17
The forces, dollars, manpower and description of each
program element are displayed in the FYDP. The purpose of the
program element is to aggregate these units most meaningfully
and conveniently for top level decision-making. All program
elements taken together constitute the complete defense
establishment
.
Publication of the JSOP-II and the Fiscal Guidance
Memorandum (FGM) (IV and V in Figure 7) in February and March
of each year, respectively, sets the stage for the third new
document, the JCS Joint Force Memorandum (JFM). The JFM is
issued in April and presents force level and support program
proposals in a format similar to JSOP-II, but the JCS recommen-
dations have to be reworked to reflect the fiscal constraints
of the JSOP-II recommendations, the JFM will contain JCS assess-
ment of risks associated with reducing the JSOP-II recommended
forces to meet fiscal constraints. Since risk assessment in
the JFM considers the strategy and objectives of the Strategic
Guidance Memorandum and Parts I and II of the JSOP, it serves
to highlight major force issues that must be resolved during
the year. These force issues are taken into consideration when
17DODINST 7045.7, p. 3.

29
copies of the Joint Force Memorandum are distributed to OSD for
review and to the military departments and defense agencies for
further guidance in their planning activities (VI in Figure 7).
The JFM exerts considerable influence in determining
force levels and priorities and illustrates the more active
role of the JCS in developing the FYDP—more active than was
18
the case in recent years.
While the JCS play a considerable role in the revised
procedures, there is also a major increase in tasks and
responsibilities of the military departments and defense
agencies. In May of each year, each of these components submits
a Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to OSD for review (III in
19
Figure 7). The POM is a comprehensive and detailed presen-
tation of the forces and manpower proposed by each military
department and defense agency within the constraints of the
Fiscal Guidance Memorandum. The POM's reflect the strategy
and objectives of the previously discussed inputs (JSOP-I,
JSOP-II. SGM, FGM, and JFM) as well as an assessment of risks





The POM is the fourth new document and is defined as
follows: A memorandum in prescribed format submitted to
SecDef by the Secretary of a military department or the Director
of a defense agency which recommends the total requirements
within the parameters of the published SecDef fiscal guidance.
DODINST 7045.7, p. 4.

.30
resulting from any deviation which a military department feels
may arise by conformance to the above plans and memoranda.
Since the POM proposes a total military department or
defense agency program in terms of forces, manpower and costs,
it is necessary to assemble all the requirements for early
examination and to have decision-making or formulation of
practical alternatives and recommendations, at the sponsor/
20program coordination levels. Once this has been accomplished
and the department or agency program objectives have been
defined, the POM is submitted to OSD. The Navy POM, when
completed, accomplishes two essential goals:
1. It provides orderly processes for establishing
the Department of the Navy position on forces.
2. It provides early completion of the main framework
on the Navy's Budget Estimate.
The POM corresponds to the Draft Presidential Memorandum
(DPM) of the previous PPB procedure, however it represents one
of the major PPBS revisions. The difference is that instead of
having initial analysis and presentation of alternatives
presented by OSD, as was the situation noted earlier about the
McNamara approach to decision-making and control, the POM is
initiated exclusively by a military department or defense agency
20






and then submitted to SecDef and his staff. This change of
events is described by Mr. Olewine as follows:
This is a highly significant turn of events. It places
the burden of detailed initial force planning and
tradeoff analysis with the military services and defense
agencies, which represents a considerable deviation from
the previous procedures . 21
Based upon a review of the individual POM's by the
SecDef, a series of Program Decision Memoranda are issued to
reflect the Secretary's program decisions (VIII in Figure 7).
These Program Decision Memoranda (PDM) are to be completed by
the end of July each year, however, there is provision for DOD
components to express a dissenting view to any of the PDM's.
If this occurs, SecDef will direct appropriate staff reviews
of any documented dissenting views and any new decisions
resulting from such review will be reflected in modified POM's.
These reviews are scheduled to take place during the month of
August each year and would coincide with the meeting between the
JCS and service secretaries, and SecDef to discuss and resolve
any remaining major force issues. The meeting, or series of
meetings, result in the Final PDM to be reflected in an updated
FYDP. In the case of the Navy, this is shown in Figure 8 as
the DNFYP (Department of the Navy Five Year Program)— in either
case, the update has occurred and it remains to fit the budget
to the scope and dimension of the FYDP/DNFYP.
2
1




The budget cycle in the past was such that grass roots
preparation began long before definitive guidance was available
for the budget year. Because of the lack of fiscal guidance,
a large part of the PPB cycle was spent working on plans with
total costs in excess of finally approved budgets. This
necessitated frequently frantic budget trimming from October to
December on a program that took nine months to structure (see
Figure 7) . Under the revised system, it is expected that
budget submission will be within the constraints of the FGM and
22
the October-December time frame will be used for fine-tuning.
In order to conform to the FGM constraints, it appears that the
emphasis will be on a more analytical budget preparation by
each service department. The implication here is that each
military department and defense agency will revise its own
budget preparation procedures— as was the case with the Depart-
ment of the Navy when it hired the accounting firm of Haskins
and Sells to undertake a five year study of its accounting
23
system. A complete analysis of the firm's first two reports






23Lecture by ADM Lescara, Deputy Comptroller of the
Navy, Office of the Comptroller of the Navy, given to Navy
Financial Management Program Class of 1971, George Washington
University on 9 November, 19 70.
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accounting be discussed, however, matters pertaining to
possible budget revisions will be discussed as they relate to
the Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation (RDT&E) and
Procurement Aircraft and Missiles, Navy (PAMN) Appropriations.
A review of the Budgeting Phase on Figure 8 illustrates
the process as it now exists with Budget Guidance coming from
SecDef and going to the two military services in the Department
of the Navy. Command relationships and Budget responsibility
were shown in the Introduction—here it is only important to
remember that the Comptroller of the Navy (NAVCOMPT) has the
responsibility for overall coordination of budget and fiscal
matters related to the programs of both services (USN and
USMC)
.
Budget Guidance from SecDef is issued through the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy ( Financial Management) (ASN(FM))
to the NAVCOMPT ( Budget) (NCB) which coordinates the budget
development in order to shape estimates into a tentative overall
Departmental Budget with clear delineation of significant
problems which reguire further consideration and discussion at
higher levels within the Department.
The Navy and Marine Corps prepare their budgets and
present them to NCB— these are monitored by the Director,
Office of Program Appraisal (OPA) and the ASN(FM). Generally
speaking, significant differences which cannot be reconciled

•34
between the NCB staff and the officials from the component
24
commands are referred to the CNO Advisory Board (CAB), with
major policy questions still outstanding being referred to
either the CNO or CMC. If differences still exist, the SecNav
makes the final decision.
The various budgets are then presented to SecNav who
decides upon the Departmental Budget. Once approved by
SecNav, NCB prepares the overall Budget Estimates and these
are presented to SecDef at the Budget Hearings. The Budget
Estimates (IX on Figure 7) are reviewed by Office of Manage-
ment and Budget (OMB) and OSD and once a tentative Program
Budget Decision (PBD) is made, the NCB coordinates reclamas
and presents these to SecNav for decision. SecNav in turn
presents the Budget to SecDef for Final PBD. Once approved,
the FYDP/DNFYP are updated and the Departmental Budget becomes
a part of the Presidential Budget which is submitted to the
Congress
.
Congressional approval initiates the Budget Execution
Phase for the Navy. The development of operating budgets and
apportionment data is undertaken by the organizations which are
24
The CNO Advisory Board was created by CNO to ensure that
top military personnel consider the Navy's program decisions and
their budgetary and manpower implications. It consists of:
Vice CNO, six Deputy CNO ' s , the CNM, Assistant Vice CNO(Admin),
DepComptroller , CMC representative and the Director, Navy
Program Planning. RADM W. D. Gaddis, "Budget Process in the




responsible for the various appropriations, as well as by their
component commands or activities, prior to receipt by NAVCOMPT
of specific guidance from the AsstSecDef( Comptroller )
.
The SecNav has assigned the responsibility for allocation
of funds and administration of apportionments to NAVCOMPT who
in turn allocates funds to CNO, CMC, ASN(R&D) and to the Naval
Material Command (NMC), each of whom is required to exercise
effective control of financial operations within established
procedures and systems. The process of distributing financial
authority, and the accompanying responsibility for control,
accounting, and reporting, is continued through the chain of
command in the form of suballocation allotments, operating
25budgets or operating targets. In the case of the Naval Air
Systems Command (NavAir), the Deputy Commander for Plans and
Programs, and Comptroller administers the budget for RDT&E and
PAMN Appropriations.
The reprogramming or reallocation of available funds in
the Navy is dependent upon established thresholds which
determine the level of required approval. Once approved,
reprogramming documents become authorization for adjustment to
the base program as reported to the Congress and documented








progress then become a record of program execution in response
to the appropriations act.
The time scope of the complete budget cycle covers three
or more years, so that at least three annual programs are
being dealt with at all times.
Since NAVCOMPT/NCB plays such a key role throughout the
budgeting process, any revision of present budgeting procedures
will start with them and center around those areas that make
conformance to FGM constraints difficult. One major area
requiring revision is the decentralization of responsibility
that exists in terms of appropriations.
Because of the "grass roots" approach to budgeting which
is still used, various organizational units direct different
phases of budget formulation and execution continuously— as
noted earlier, in any one year three different FY budgets are
being worked on. This decentralization has fragmented authority
and responsibility and has contributed to the inability of the
system to accomplish budget formulation and execution effectively
and efficiently, further, it resulted in the establishment of
informal relationships and responsibilities which were viewed
by the Haskins and Sells study as follows:
Such informal relationships are not conducive to
required coordination of activity and they contribute
to duplication of effort, particularly in the review
phase of budget formulation. Overlapping reviews exist
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at many levels, but primarily between NAVCOMPT and
CNO. These overlapping reviews provide opportunities
to avoid fixing responsibility. ^°
Another area requiring revision is in the correlation of
FYDP/DNFYP and Appropriation Structures. The problem is to
formulate a budget where preparation is on one basis and
Congressional approval is on another. The Navy has accomplished
this correlation in several areas, however, in the PAMN type
funds this has not been done. The translation of program
oriented plans into traditional appropriation terms for
Congressional presentation has resulted in the existence of
many different concepts, terms and reconciliations, and has
caused compromises to be made so that the two would be more
compatible. Although the FYDP and Appropriation structures
relate to some degree, "... it is frequently difficult to
respond to additional requests for detailed information on an
27
accurate and timely basis."
In line with the above is the problem with the Navy Cost
Information System (NCIS) which was established to provide a
set of uniform data to be used within the Navy for planning,
96
Study of the Accounting System of the Department of
the Navy
,
Haskins & Sells, Certified Public Accountants,
Washington, D.C. This is the first report submitted to the
Navy. It is report number N00600-70-C-0565 and was published








programming and budgeting appraisal. Its objective is to
translate the Navy's appropriation structure to the FYDP
structure. The system is considered NAVCOMPT's general purpose
financial management information system, consolidating the
Navy's approved cost and defense program changes into an
29
automated data file. The great potential value of NCIS is
not being realized because presently it is updated on an
irregular basis and certified obligations are entered only
once a year. Any NAVCOMPT budgeting revisions will have to
consider updating NCIS input procedures if its full utilization
30
is to be obtained.
No budget procedure revisions have come from NAVCOMPT
for two reasons:
1. The full implications of the new PPB system have
not been fully recognized. The FY 72 Budget was the first





The Haskins & Sells report evaluated NCIS as follows:
"This Data Bank is reported to be the only place in the Navy
that brings together the appropriation and FYDP structures
moneys, with manpower, and materials (weapons systems and
equipment). To this extent, and with the knowledge that the
data are reasonably accurate, this historical data file should
serve a useful purpose to top-level Navy managers for analyses





months ago— it is still too early to evaluate the changes and
31
what effect they have had.
2. The study pinpointing the various problem areas was
published less than eight months ago, to review and evaluate
all of its recommendations requires a great deal of time and
staffing.
Unlike the areas of Planning and Programming, there are
no concrete revisions that can be pointed out in Budgeting
—
what can be shown is the fact that the pressure of fiscal
constraint conformance has caused one military department to
re-evaluate its efforts in this area. It is felt that the




Lecture by VADM Bell, Director, Navy Program Planning,
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, given to Navy
Financial Management Program Class of 19 71, George Washington
University on 14 December, 1970.

CHAPTER III
PROCUREMENT CONTRACTS AND DOD REVISIONS
AFFECTING THEM
There are many types of military procurement contracts
in use and each has its own characteristics. In order to
reduce the overall number of contracts for discussion, this
chapter will cover only those most frequently used and
preferred by the Department of Defense (DOD) in aircraft
procurement. The advantages and disadvantages of each will
> be reviewed and will serve as a lead-in to the next point of
discussion— the actual weapon system acquisition procedure as
applied in the Navy during the 1969-19 70 time period and based
upon DOD policy and PPBS . After discussion of the acquisition
process, recent policy changes related to contracting will be
reviewed. The chapter will conclude with examination of the
factors which brought about the policy changes.
A study in 1968 by the Weapon Systems Group of the
Aerospace Industries Association listed nine different types




Regulation (ASPR) Section 3, Part 4. Of the nine, three are
described here in their order of DOD preference:
1. Firm Fixed Price (FFP)
2. Fixed Price Incentive Fee (FPI)
2
3. Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF)
In terms of the foregoing chapter on Planning-
Programming-Budgeting (PPBS), a benefit of this preference
listing may stem from the fact that the Defense Budgeting Cycle
is long and in past planning there was no fiscal constraint in
the budgeting cycle. The fact that a set figure could be
established early in a long budget preparation cycle appears
to have made some form of fixed price contracts at least easier
to work with during the year and one half period when the
military service department budget was being formulated.
Fiscal guidance, now present in the Planning Phase of PPBS
Weapon Systems Development Group, Aerospace Technical
Council and Procurement and Finance Committee, Phase II Report
,
"Essential Technical Steps and Related Uncertainties in DOD
Weapon Systems Development" (Washington, D.C.: Aerospace
Industries Association, September, 1968), Appendix A, pp. 3-5.
(Hereinafter referred to as Weapon Systems Development Group.
)
2
This preference is stated: "The precision with which
performance can be defined will largely determine the type of
contract employed, with Firm Fixed Price Contracts receiving
first consideration. ... In all major system developments,
and in other development programs where the use of cost and
performance incentives are considered administratively
practicable, Fixed Price Incentive and Cost Plus Incentive
contracts are to be considered in that order." Armed Services
Procurement Regulation, Section 3, Part 4, Paragraph 403(c).
(Hereinafter referred to as ASPR.)
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(through the Fiscal Guidance Memorandum—FGM) also makes it
highly desirable to be able to plan an acquisition based upon
a firm early dollar figure.
The above three types of contracts will be discussed
based upon the viewpoint of the Development Group Study and
the preference policy of the ASPR up to the time of the appoint-
ment of Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard. It is
felt that though the order of contract preference may change,
the overall advantages and disadvantages of each to both parties
(government and industry) will remain essentially the same.
Critical to the success of the FFP contract is whether
a fair and reasonable price has been established at the outset.
The price is based upon such conditions as definite design or
performance specifications, realistic estimates, adequate
competition, reasonable price comparison and reasonable alloca-
tion of risks. Proper consideration of these factors can be
the key to FFP effectiveness.
When applicable, FFP is most advantageous to the government
because it shifts risk and responsibility to the contractor and
requires much less administration. It tends to reinforce the
budgeting process because a fixed amount is established. It is
disadvantageous to the government because of the following
factors: (a) the price must contain some contingencies,
(b) there is no in-process control of work, (c) there is less
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visibility of cost data, and (d) a complete formality is
required for any changes. Additionally, the contract pre-
supposes a presolution of any design problems.
FFP advantages on the contractor side include the
potential for higher profit, minimum governmental control,
well-defined specifications, better cost estimates, and less
financial audit. The disadvantages can be summed up in two
points: total risk assumption and non-acceptance by the
government of cost contingencies.
The next contract, Fixed Price Incentive (FPI) was
recommended by the ASPR when the FFP contract was inappro-
priate (inadequate design or performance specifications are
not available, etc.) and when "... supplies are such that
contractor cost risk provide a profit incentive to control cost
3
and performance." The factors needing consideration in this
choice of contract are: (a) that the least costly method must
be determined and (b) that the procurement effort may be
impractical if any other contract type is employed. The ASPR
indicated that FPI was to be used for less complex systems or
production contracts where cost incentives existed and where
there was a possibility of cost reduction and/or performance
3
Weapon Systems Development Group, Appendix A, p. 3.

•44
improvements by giving the contractor either a degree of cost
4
responsibility and/or a positive profit incentive.
Governmental advantages of the FPI contract are that it
spreads risk, has less reason for price contingencies,
encourages and incentivizes efficiency, and makes the con-
tractor responsible for management. Disadvantages would be
that, as with FFP, no ceiling on profit could be imposed thus
requiring that a budget for the contract be based upon the
contract ceiling price, increased administrative costs, minimum
control of work in process, and complex contract negotiations.
Technical difficulties might arise because FPI precludes
technical direction and limits innovation.
FPI advantages to the contractor would include the
potential for a higher profit because of the greater risk
involved, good management would be rewarded, and there would
be less governmental control. The disadvantages that might
result would be a price ceiling, detailed accounting records,
government verification of costs, and also complex negotiations.
The least preferred of the three contract types mentioned
is Cost Plus Incentive Fee (CPIF). The ASPR considered it
suitable in the development and test phase when "... a
cost-reimbursement type of contract is found necessary . . .
4
ASPR, Section 3, Part 4, Paragraph 404.4.
5
Weapon Systems Development Group, Appendix A, p. 3.
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and when a target and a fee adjustment formula can be negoti-
ated which are likely to provide the contractor with a positive
profit incentive for effective management.
"
CPIF governmental advantages include providing motivation
for cost-effectiveness through a bonus/penalty arrangement,
share of in-process control of work, and cost visibility. On
the disadvantage side, CPIF can bring about overrun costs, high
administrative costs, complex negotiations, high risks, and the
reduced opportunity to manage.
The advantages of CPIF to the contractor are the limited
risk, possibility of an increased fee, assurance of recovering
costs, and the reward for good management. Disadvantages might
include reduced fees because of the reduced risk, an absolute
limit on the fee, disallowance of certain normal business costs,
more government engagement, and complex negotiations.
7
Additionally, there would be the ASPR XV audit.
The selection of an appropriate procurement contract
which is equitable to both sides and which results in a
successful acquisition is based upon many factors. The intro-
duction of fiscal guidance in the early PPBS Phases was shown
to have a decided influence upon planning and programming.
This fact plus the point made earlier about a reduction in
r
ASPR, Section 3, Part 4, Paragraph 405.4(b).
n
Weapon Systems Development Group, Appendix A, p. 10.
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defense spending makes contract selection an important
consideration in any acquisition process. In addition, the
order of contract preference has changed somewhat and the
changes as they relate to the three types mentioned will be
discussed later in the chapter.
The PPBS Cycle in Chapter II developed a Program Objec-
tive for each military department. Implicit in the cycle was
the planning, programming, and budgeting required for each
Program Element to enable it to attain its portion of the
overall military department Program Objective. Once the
mission of a Program Element was established during the Pro-
gramming Phase, the essentiality for it to successfully
accomplish its assigned mission may have required a new or
improved weapon system.
The process whereby a new weapon is presently acquired
is illustrated in Figure 9— the point here is that the develop-
8
ment and subsequent acquisition of any major weapon system:
(a) proceeds through several phases/stages, (b) involves a long
period of time, and (c) requires the use of different
Q
"A major weapon system is one in which the cumulative
RDT&E cost is estimated to be in excess of twenty-five million
dollars or for those systems for which production inventory
costs are expected to exceed one hundred million dollars."
Chief of Naval Operations Instruction (OPNAVINST) 3900. 8C,
OP-701, Serial 64P70, January, 1966, "Planning Procedures for
the Navy Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E)





















































































































































































appropriations (see "Time in each stage" and "FUNDING" in
Figure 10). These factors suggest the applicability of dif-
ferent contracts for different phases. An example of this is
shown in Table 4 which compares contract applicability to a
particular phase and cites the ASPR reference in each case.
The references cited in Table 4 are the same as those
used in the previous discussion about contract advantages and
disadvantages. The table is shown to illustrate the applica-
bility of contract types as listed in the ASPR that stated the
earlier contract preference.
The use of the terms "contracts" and "appropriations"
connotes that formalized procedures exist, for this reason
some understanding of the actual acquisition process as it now
exists must be present in order to gauge the impact any recent
or future changes have on the process. Based upon this
reasoning, the following will describe aircraft acquisition
procedures now used by the Navy and will highlight recent DOD
policy changes.
Acquisition of a major aircraft weapon system in the
Navy begins with a General Operational Requirement (GOR) from
a "User" (see Figure 9 ) to a Program Sponsor (DCNO(Air)). The
GOR is a broad statement of objectives and goals for further
operational capabilities needed in a major warfare or support
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It coincides with the NSS Annexes and provides guidance to the
technical community for up-dating the technology necessary to
support future warfare systems development. In addition to
initiating the Conceptual Phase (Figure 9), or Concept Formula-
tion Stage (Figure 10), the GOR is also an invitation to the
Naval Material Command (NMC) to submit Proposed Technical
Approaches (PTA) for achieving needed future capabilities when
9
the necessary support technology becomes available.
Based upon the requirements set forth in the GOR,
DCNO ( Development ) sets forth Exploratory Development Goals
(EDG, Figure 9 ) on a technical basis for investigations,
feasibility studies, experimental efforts and for the minor
development required to advance technology in various func-
tional areas. EDG's are a follow-on of the GOR and serve to
define the nature of the requirement more fully. Once the
goals have been analyzed, a Tentative Specific Operational
Requirement (TSOR) is prepared by DCNO(Air) and sent to the
9Navy Programming Manual
,
OPNAV 90P-1C, January, 1969,
pp. D-7 to D-10 defines: PROGRAM SPONSOR— the DCNO who has
been designated as responsible for determining program objec-
tives, time-phasing, and support requirements, and for
appraising progress, readiness and military worth of specific
programs. PROGRAM ELEMENT SPONSOR—DCNO who is responsible
for force composition, funding support, and programmed manpower
for a specific Program Element. He is responsible for objec-
tives and planned programs for the out-years, as well as for




Naval Air Systems Command (NavAir) via NMC. A TSOR is a set of
requirements and is the initial step in the formal exchange of
documents between the planner DCNO(Air) and the executor
(NavAir) in the RDT&E planning cycle. Since it is the first
step toward arriving at an aircraft definition, it includes
procurement, operation and maintenance costs and tentatively
states the requirement for a particular capability, identifies
the anticipated threat, outlines operational concepts by
defining those performance and operational characteristics
which can be specified, and indicates the time period in which
the aircraft is needed. It is important to note that
promulgation of a TSOR by DCNO does not establish a firm
requirement, nor does it authorize commencing a new develop-
ment program.
NavAir responds to the TSOR in the form of Proposed
Technical Approaches (PTA) which present CNO with different
alternatives and provide the technical information upon which
to base a decision for further development. The information
includes an appraisal of the technical risk involved for the
several approaches, a technical appraisal of reliability,







apply to systems similar to that being considered are also
included in the PTA.
Presentation of the PTA to CNO sets the requirement for
the Program Sponsor to respond with an Advanced Development
Objective (ADO, Figure 9) stating the need to conduct certain
experimental studies, test, and development. By outlining
objectives in the ADO, DCNO requires NavAir to document those
actions, procedures, and resources needed to describe a
specific weapon system requirement. This documentation is
called the Technical Development Plan (TDP) and includes plans
for the development, production installation, integrated
logistic support, reliability, maintainability, test and
evaluation, and personnel training for the project. TDP also
provides cost estimates and if Formal Contract Definition will
be employed, the TDP also contains a plan for the conduct of
Contract Definition.
Submission of TDP to DCNO completes the Exploratory
Development of the Conceptual Phase. The dominant charac-
teristic throughout this period has been a general level of
effort directed toward a specific military problem area with a
view of developing and evaluating the feasibility and
Navy Logistics Management School, Navy Department
Planning and Management Systems Course, Glossary of Abbrevia-






practicability of proposed solutions and determining their
parameters
.
Advanced Development in the Conceptual Phase (Figure 9)
begins with designation of a Project Manager and ends with the
Specific Operational Requirement (SOR) which defines a required
capability in terms of mission requirement, operational concept
and performance constraints.
The Conceptual Phase is highly iterative— its stages
overlap rather than occur in exact sequence. Information flow
of the interacting inputs of operational need and technology
(shown on Figures 9 and 10) bring about the following:
1. Identification and Definition of Conceptual
Systems.
2. Analysis (threat, mission, feasibility, risk,
cost, trade-offs, etc.).
3. Experimentation and Test (of operational require-
ments, key components, critical subsystems and marginal
technology)
.
The outputs of the Conceptual Phase are alternative
systems (including a preferred system) and their associated
program characteristics (costs, schedules, and operational
parameters) based on a combination of analyses, experiments
and test results. The Service (Figure 11), in this case CNO,
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needs and new systems to meet those needs and: starting a
dialogue with OSD on the new systems and the "turning points"
for decisions; identifying the competing systems (both con-
ceptual and existing); conducting analyses (threat, feasibility,
trade-off studies, risks, cost-effectiveness, etc.); conducting
technology and component development and critical experiments;
making cost and schedule estimates; and finally optimizing
conceptual systems in order to arrive at a proposed system and
12program.
The decision to continue development of a new major
weapon system in any of the military departments is dependent
upon a Program Decision (DSARC, Milestone 1, Figure 9 and
Figure 11) by SecDef which is part of the PDM discussed
earlier in the PPBS chapter.
Within the past four years, two new means of assisting
the SecDef in Program Decisions have been developed— the
Development Concept Paper (DCP) and the Defense System
Acquisition Review Council (DSARC). The DCP was inaugurated
in the fall of 1967 because "... DOD decision-makers needed
precise information on the threat, the operational capabilities
neeeded, alternative means of meeting the threat, forces
12Navy Logistics Management School, Weapons Systems
Acquisition Course, Weapon Systems Acquisition (Washington,




needed, time elements, and costs involved." it is a high-
level, objectively prepared, document which ties all of the
above requirements into a comprehensive balanced analysis upon
which SecDef can make a Program Decision. The DCP clarifies
the responsibilities, specifies what has been approved, why it
was approved, and includes an assessment of the technology
involved. It communicates not only the decision, but also
14the reasons behind that decision and it insures continuity.
In its final form, the DCP has been signed by the
Secretary, or Assistant Secretary( R&D) of each military depart-
ment involved; by JCS; and by various Assistant Secretaries
of Defense when their functions are involved.
DSARC was established in May, 1969, when the Deputy
SecDef issued a memorandum to that effect. The purpose of
DSARC is to advise the DepSecDef of the status and readiness
of each major system prior to proceeding to the next phase of
the effort in its life cycle. The Council serves "... to
complement the DCP system, which continues as a formal








14 T , .,Ibid .
15
The Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum for
Secretaries of the Military Departments, Director, Defense
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Council review occurs at three decisive points in
acquisition: first, when the sponsoring Service desires to
initiate Contract Definition (or equivalent effort); second,
when it is desired to go from Contract Definition to Full-
Scale Development; and third, when it is desired to transition
from development to production for Service Deployment (Figures
9, 10 and 11 all illustrate these three key decision points.)
Table 4 indicated earlier that each of these decision points
might also mean a different contract at each point.
The SecDef decision to continue with an acquisition
program (based upon DCP and DSARC) begins the Validation Phase
(Figures 9 and 11) or, as it was called, the Contract Defini-
17
tion Stage (Figure 10). The decision or commitment is
generally limited to the Validation Phase and the DCP identifies
Research and Engineering, Assistant Secretary of Defense ( Comp-
troller)
,
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and
Logistics), Assistant Secretary of Defense ( Systems Analysis);
dated 30 May, 1969, subject: Establishment of a Defense






Use of the term "Validation Phase" appears to have
been a result of the DepSecDef May, 1969, Memo. Although the
memo uses the term Contract Definition as a phase, it qualifies
the phrase description by the statement "or equivalent effort."
As a result of this, plus the fact that the Contract Definition
section of the memo uses the term "validity" in five of the
eight DSARC aspects, it appears that the Navy has adopted the





limits on programs approved and thresholds on key program
characteristics. These thresholds are operating limits that
cause SecDef to review the program if they are exceeded or
expected to be exceeded, and they cannot be changed without
SecDef approval.
Validation is the phase in which major program
characteristics (technical, cost and schedule) are validated
through extensive analysis and hardware development by the
contractor ( s ) who will do the full-scale development. The
validation is in the form of commitments that contractors are
willing to make (contracts they will sign) on the major program
characteristics.
As shown in Figure 11, the Service has primary respon-
sibility for the execution of this phase, both in-house and
under contract, and for advising OSD of program status,
including anticipated or actual breaching of DCP thresholds.
The Service (or NavAir) activities include solicitation of
contractors, Reguest for Proposals (RFP's), evaluation of
proposals, selection of contractors, award of contracts,
collaboration with contractors and planning of future
activities. Additionally, the Validation Phase includes the
Project Master Plan ( PMP on Figure 9) which is a compilation
of planning documents prepared by the Project Manager, with
assistance from participating organizations and contractors,
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and which places in context the plans, schedules, costs and
scope of all work and resources to be provided by each
participating organization. The PMP defines a management
approach for acquiring items and serves to satisfy specified
operational requirements.
There are many ways in which this phase can be conducted,
however, in this study only two will be discussed— Contract
-| gDefinition and Parallel Prototype Development (PPD).
Contract Definition, as a means of conducting the
Validation Phase, is a formal procedure preceding full-scale
development. During Contract Definition preliminary engineering
and contract and management planning are accomplished in order
to arrive at a realistic set of design characteristics, cost
estimates, schedules, schedule estimates, definition of high
risk areas, as well as definition of system interfaces and
management responsibilities. The ultimate objective of this
phase is to permit firm fixed price or fully structured
incentive contracts. Contract Definition, where directed for
19
major weapon systems, consists of three parts or phases:
Phase A The period in which competing contractors
are selected for Contract Definition. It starts with
conditional approval of Engineering Development and
1 8




19OPNAVINST 3900. 8C, p. 7.
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ends with an award of Contract Definition Contracts
to two or more competing industrial firms.
Phase B Begins with the award of Contract
Definition Contracts and ends with the contractors'
submittals of Contract Definition reports and
development proposals.
Phase C Begins immediately after the submission
of Phase B reports and proposals and it ends with
the signing of a definitive development contract. 20
Parallel Prototype Development (PPD) differs from the
above in the area of hardware. Similar actions in terms of
paper work occur in both, however, PPD has the added advantage
of evaluating hardware. It is preferred to rely more on
hardware development and evaluation than just paper studies,
since this provides a better definition of program charac-
teristics, higher confidence that risks have been resolved or
21
minimized, and greater confidence in the ultimate outcome.
A major consideration between the two is the increased
time and money involved in PPD because it forces contractors
to push the state-of-the-art by asking for prototypes.
The result of the Validation Phase is that SecDef must
make a Ratification Decision (Figure 11 and shown as DSARC,
Milestone 2 on Figure 9). This decision, again based upon a
DCP and supported by DSARC, is whether to proceed with the
20
Navy Logistics Management School, Navy Department
Planning and Management Systems Course, Project Management in
the Navy (Washington, D.C., 1970), p. 40.






program into Full-Scale Development or some other course of
action, for instance, to continue the Validation Phase. If
the decision approves continuation to the next phase, the
updated DCP identifies the limits of program approval (which
are generally limited to conduct of the next phase), and thres-
holds on key program characteristics.
Full-Scale Development will include development of all
items necessary for support of the weapon system—training
equipment, maintenance equipment, handbooks for operation and
maintenance—which is designed, fabricated and tested. The
intended output is a hardware model and the documentation
needed to produce for inventory use. An essential activity
of the Full-Scale Development Phase is test and evaluation,
both that conducted by contractors and that conducted by the
military department.
NavAir, through the Program Manager at CNO, has primary
responsibility for the execution of the aircraft programs, both
those portions that are accomplished in-house and those under
contract, and for advising OSD of program changes, status,
including anticipated or actual breaching of DCP thresholds.
This includes adjustments, within present thresholds, or
various program characteristics to protect any threshold that
is threatened. NavAir activities include the actual procure-
ment, contract administration, collaboration with contractors,

•63
planning future activities, detailed management of the program,
and periodic reporting to OSD through CNO.
As was the case before, Full-Scale Development leads
to another DSARC Milestone—Production Decision. The decision
by SecDef , again based upon an updated DCP and supported by
DSARC (Milestone 3, Figure 11), is on the transition from
development to production, i.e., whether to proceed into
production for operational use and the quantity to be produced.
This is the last of the DSARC decisions, because normally the
22decision to produce for inventory use is a decision to deploy.
Once this decision has been made to go into production, the
Navy has primary responsibility for execution of the program
and to advise OSD of program status, including anticipated or
actual breaching of DCP thresholds (Figure 11).
In the foregoing discussion about contracts and the
acquisition process, only two major developments or changes
were introduced because they were such an integral part of the
process. The recent DepSecDef Memo of 28 May, 1970, entitled
"Policy Guidance on Major Weapon System Acquisition," which
brought about substantial changes affecting contract preference
and the various phases were not included because the purpose
was to emphasize them by summarization. These changes will be







Greater flexibility in the use of contracts was one of
the major changes in the Memo. Contrary to the order des-
cribed in the ASPR (page 41, footnote 2; and Table 4, page 50)
,
the new policy is to tailor the contract type to the risk
involved, with CPIF contracts being preferred for both Advanced
Development and Full-Scale Development (Figure 9). Use of FFP
contracts is encouraged only in those areas: "When risks
have been reduced to the extent that realistic pricing can take
23
place . . . . " The thought here is that contracts should
not be a hindrance but should be an aid in the acquisition
process if and when they are in the best interest of the
program.
Policy changes in all development phases are based on
the premise that:
The cost of developing and acquiring new weapon systems
is more dependent upon making practical trade-offs
between the stated operating requirements and engineering
design that upon any other factor. This must be the key
consideration at every step in development from the
Conceptual stage (Phase) until the new weapon goes into
the force. 24
Consideration of this factor plus the program schedule struc-
ture are important areas to be constantly reviewed. Policy
23Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum for Secre-
taries of the Military Departments, Director of Defense
Research and Engineering, The General Counsel, Assistants
to the Secretary of Defense, and Directors of Defense Agencies;












towards scheduling is directed towards allowing time for
accomplishing important task objectives "... without
25
unnecessary overlapping or concurrency.
"
Technical risk, which accompanies most new programs, is
to be minimized during Conceptual Development by the following:
1. Risk Assessment— careful assessment of the technical
problem involved (shown in the PTA and TDP) and a judgment as
to how much effort is likely to be necessary in finding a
solution that is practical.
2. System and Hardware Proofing— the Memo stated that
the only way to minimize technical risk was to do enough
actual design and testing to demonstrate that the risks have
been minimized or eliminated. Though mentioned in the Memo
as a part of the Conceptual Phase, it may be more appropriate
to classify it also under Validation and tie it in with the
point made earlier about Parallel Prototype Development.
3. Trade-Off (risk avoidance)— the practical aspect of
continual trade-off analysis between stated operating require-
ments and engineering design was emphasized because they
affected program risk and cost to such a large degree.
These three means of reducing technical risks were considered




in the DCP's used for the Program Decision (Figure 11 and
DSARC, Milestone 1 on Figure 9).
Contract Definition (in the Validation Phase) is to be
less of a paper work study and more a technical risk assess-
ment area. Point Two above made this clear— again the overall
direction in the Memo is reduction/elimination of technical
risks so that the acquisition process remains controllable.
The Memo stated that Full-Scale Development and Produc-
tion (Figure 11) would proceed based upon Milestone Decisions
(DSARC 's 2 and 3 in Figure 9). This policy was covered in the
Chapter discussion, however, the Memo adds that in each phase
basic trade-off analysis will continually be present and
trade-offs will be made where practical.
Production policy is spelled out quite clearly:
The most important consideration before moving into
Full-Scale Production on a new weapon system is to
have assurance that the engineering design is completed,
that all major problems have been resolved, and this has
been demonstrated to the extent practical by actual
performance testing. 26
The overall goals of the Memo appear to be twofold:
proper contract selection and minimized technical risk through
27
practical trade-off.
The rationale that brought about the above changes,




p. 4. Ibid . , pp. 1-6.
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contracting is illustrated. Contracting is most difficult in
the Defense Establishment because as a rule major systems are
not purchased "off the shelf," but have to be developed. Some
idea of the time involved in this process was shown in
Figure 10. Along these lines, the Weapons Systems Development
Group mentioned earlier, pinpointed the Contract Definition
Phase (now called Validation Phase) as a main problem area by
citing the rigidity of a fixed price type contract:
Contract Definition, as practiced today (1968), does
not assure an adequate technical baseline for commit-
ment to a fixed-price type contract for engineering
development . 28
In their report, the Development Group cited Department of
Defense Directive 3200.9, "Initiation of Engineering and
Operational Systems Development," in its requirement that the
procuring agency not contract for engineering development
until first, the required base technology was sufficiently
established and second, when primarily only further engineering
effort was necessary. The contention of the report was that
final configuration could not be determined to an appropriate
degree during Contract Definition. Further, the report argued
that the current DOD policy and practice (in the 1968 time
frame), combined with the severe competitive environment of
the defense market, resulted in contractor commitment, at the
p o
Weapon Systems Development Group, p. 7.
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end of Contract Definition, to a firm-fixed price or fixed
price incentive fee contract with inappropriately low price
ceilings. This coincides with a statement made a year later
(1969) by Mr. David S. Lewis, President of McDonnell-Douglas
Corporation, when he was asked what he considered to be the
major problem associated with development and production of
military hardware:
I believe totally in the business of negotiating
thorough and well-written, firm, full contracts, and then
let's get on with the job. . . . But during a competi-
tion (the phases of Contract Definition mentioned earlier)
there will be nothing of significance bought by DOD , like
big programs. . . . You're (DOD and contractors)
establishing contract terms in the heat of intensive
competition ... So these contract terms that you gener-
ate are done in the heat of competition which means tight
prices ... so we get the price contract and then we
are trapped! Everybody is trapped. . . . Technical
innovation is something that's largely eliminated, even
if you can take the time required to get the agony of
the change control system to be operative. . . . But
more . . . important . . . the intelligence obtained by
DOD may indicate that some basic changes are required
in defense programs (changes to Program Objectives of
the service departments) to meet the test that was
actuated when the new program was approved. ... We
are off and running. ... A year later we are saying
that the contract needs to be changed or we won't do the
job, not on the old ground rules but on the new . . .
you're in agony. . . . You must change, the money isn't
there, and the Air Force is not receiving enough
allowance to fill its budget. ... So here we are asked
on the one hand to bid feverishly and competitively
. . . and with the other hand we are asked to take on an
excruciatingly high rate of contract risk with ten per
cent of the base value of our contract which can be the
penalty for five different things; where there is no
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mention of incentive except that we are going to be
sure that they can't be multiplied up into good
earnings . 29
The effect of this situation—unidentified remaining
technical uncertainties and rigid contracting— in the opinion
of the Group causes the following:
1. An increase in the possibility that the
government mission reguirement will not be satis-
factorily met.
2. An undermining of the basic DOD operational
and fiscal planning projections.
3. The allocation of an inordinately heavy
financial risk to the prime/subcontractor structure.
The Weapon Development Group Report concluded:
"
. . . conditions could be substantially improved, if, in
the selection of contract type, adeguate recognition were
given to the degree of technical uncertainty, " and it made
three recommendations for the solution of the existing
situation. It first recommended that the present DOD policy
recongize that technical uncertainties in each weapon system
are a major factor to be considered in the appropriate contract
method determination. Secondly, the report recommended the
establishment of a standing board to review and make final
29
Panel Discussion, Air Force Institute of Technology
(AU) 12th Annual Education with Industry Symposium, 30 Septem-
ber-2 October, 1969, Newport Beach, California.
30
Weapon System Development Group, pp. 1-11.
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determination of the contracting method to be used on all major
acquisitions. Finally, the report recommended the establish-
ment of a working interface with industry to study the problem
with the objective of developing further contract selection
31guidance
.
These recommendations were made in September, 1968;
eight months later in May, 1969, the new DepSecDef issued the
DSARC Memo which established the milestone decision points
and essentially adopted the first two recommendations of the
Group— the third could also be considered to have been adopted
because of the new DOD attitude that existed as a result of the
Memo.
The problem of rigid contracting still remained in 1969
(Mr. Lewis' comment in September, 1969) and seemed to be
compounded by the full funding policy set forth in Department
of Defense Directive 7200.4:
Full Funding is the term used to describe the principle
which has been applied by the Congress in providing
funds for the DOD programs which are covered within the
Procurement Title of the yearly Appropriation Act. . . .
The objective is to provide funds at the outset for the
total estimated cost of a given item so that the
Congress and the public can clearly see and have a
complete knowledge of the full dimensions and cost






32Quoted from Secretary of the Navy Instruction
(SECNAVINST) 7043. 2A , "Full Funding of DOD Procurement
Programs, NAVCOMPTrNCC, 12 December, 1969, p. 2.
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Any situations that arise either because of unexplained
difficulties or budgeting errors brings into play the Program
Change Request (PCR) or reprogramming. PCR is a document used
in the programming system to forward requested changes to the
FYDP for review and action by SecDef. At the Navy level,
reprogramming includes the review and approval of both new
programs injected through reprogramming and the program sources
of funds which are proposed as reductions to support such
actions. This is so CNO may exercise proper control over Navy
Programs and it is essential that he not only approve the
establishment of the basic requirement of these programs, but
that he supervise the budgeting and control changes in the
33budgeted programs during execution.
The important points to consider here are that:
(a) FFP contracting may be erroneous in a competitive situa-
tion (given Mr. Lewis' statement), (b) full funding is required
to understand the full cost of a weapon system program, and
(c) DSARC and DCP's are supposed to assist SecDef in program
development decision making. An overall acquisition policy
was needed to tie it all together— this was the purpose of the
28 May, 19 70 Memo which brought about the previously described
changes.
33
Navy Programming Manual, pp. 3-2, 3-3, and 4-4.
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Analysis of all the events which led to the present
changes in policy are too numerous to mention, however, both
the DSARC and Policy Memoranda were originated by the DepSecDef
,
for this reason, his assessment of previous DOD practices is
considered appropriate and the rationale for the changes can
be seen throughout the following statements:
Since it is seldom, if ever, possible to achieve the
optimum trade-off between performance and cost at the
continual trade-off procedure until final design is
achieved. I just do not see how this can be done with
a Fixed-Price total package procurement procedure except
under two possible conditions; (1) where there is no
innovation involved, (2) were a contractor is willing to
make a firm-fixed price commitment for development and
production, and where he has the resources to be able to
do so. If he wants to gamble, that is his business, but
he should be expected to cover his losses. ... We must
recognize that most of the troubles we see today, such as
the Lockheed Problem ( C-5A) , are not all the contractors 1
fault. After all, they have been encouraged in these bad
practices by policies and practices in the Department
(of Defense) for several decades. 34
Because the military departments have not managed their
programs properly in many cases (so Mr. Packard states), new
procurement techniques have evolved. It is interesting to see
Mr. Packard's rationale in this area:
. . . there has been an attempt to put more responsi-
bility on the contractors. This is the major thrust
of the total package procurement program, and it was
based on the proposition that the normal working of
Statement of Mr. David Packard, Deputy Secretary of
Defense, before the Military Operations Subcommittee, Committee
of Government Operations, House of Representatives, Hearings
on Weapons System Acquisition, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
September, 1970, p. 12.
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the American free enterprise industrial system would do
the job if given the chance. . . . This system should
work and I think it will, in fact, work when the desired
product can be completely and accurately specified in
advance, and when the contractor knows exactly how to
produce a product to the desired specifications. . . .
The basic problem in applying this technique to new
major weapons is two-fold. First, precise requirements
for a new major system generally cannot be specified in
advance. . . . The second problem is that a contractor
is often willing to agree to meet the specifications, and
in effect gamble that he will luck out, or eventually be
bailed out. ... I believe we have had enough experience
by now to correctly draw the conclusion that this so-called
competitive package approach to major weapons systems will
not work the way people thought it would a few years ago. 3 5
This chapter examined procurement contracts, the
procurement process, and recent policy changes and developments
intended to update the weapon system acquisition process. It
discussed the changes and gave some of the rationale that
brought about the changes. Perhaps the two most important
aspects of the chapter are that it indicated a change in DOD
attitude in terms of (a) contract selection and (b) the
importance of continually assessing technical risks in any







EXTERNAL FACTORS AFFECTING AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT
The last two chapters dealt with internal revisions
initiated by DOD for the purpose of making, among other things,
its procurement efforts more effective and efficient. This
chapter will discuss factors external to DOD control which can
affect aircraft procurement.
There are so many weapon systems in the DOD inventory
that it is necessary to isolate a specific one and investigate
what external factors acted on it, rather than attempt a
"survey" approach which might end up chaotic due to the wide
diversity of even one military department's inventory. Based
upon the single approach technique, the acquisition by the
Marine Corps of the Sikorsky CH-53 Heavy Assault Helicopter
will be reviewed for the purpose of determining what external
factors might have affected its procurement process. The
thought here will be to develop a cause-and-ef fect type
discussion.
The New York Times Sunday edition of 26 August, 1962,




"Marine 'Copter Contract Averts Sikorsky Lay Offs"
Stratford Connecticut, August 25: The Sikorsky
Division of United Aircraft Corporation here has
received a multimillion-dollar contract for the
production of heavy assault helicopters for the
Marine Corps.
The award, announced today, averted a lay-off of
design and production workers, according to the
company.
William P. Gwinn, President of United Aircraft
Corporation, said he was unable to disclose the
exact amount of the contract. He said the helicopter
would be an adaption of the Sikorsky S-64 "Flying
Crane. m1
The above announcement was made five months after the
FY 63 Military Appropriations Act (H.R. 9751) was approved by
Congress and was the culmination of over three years work in
the Marine Corps and Navy to seek a replacement for the
Marines' large assault helicopter, CH-37C, due to be phased
out of the inventory in 1967.
A summary of events for the period 1959-1963 will
serve the purpose of providing the necessary background events
which led up to the contract award and it will also provide a
comparison of acquisition processes— this is shown below:
16 March, 1959 CNO published Operational
Requirment Number AO-17501





1961 CNO promulgated Development
Characteristics Number AO-17501-3
New York Times, 26 August, 1962, Section L, p. 65.
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Promulgation occurred because the Tri-Service Vertical
Take-Off Land ( VTOL ) competition of 1961 was looked upon as
the answer, but it failed to produce an aircraft suitable for
Marine use. Other Tri-Service VTOL research procurements were
quickly analyzed and it was found that none of them could
provide production aircraft in time to replace the CH-3 7C on
2
schedule in 1967.
9 October, 1961 Preliminary Technical Development
Plan (TDP) for VTOL Assault Trans-
port Helicopter (Heavy) was
published by the Bureau of Naval
Weapons ( BNW)
.
This occurred because CNO directed that a design
competition be entered into on a "hurry up" basis, since so
much time had already been lost.
10 January, 196 2 A revised Preliminary TDP for the
HH-X (CH-53A) helicopter is
published by BNW.
7 March, 1962 Request for Proposals (RFP) were
mailed by BNW.
Competition here was conducted to provide a helicopter .
based upon the Operational Requirements originating with
AO-17501 which was revised 16 March, 1959. Requirements for
the Assault Transport Helicopter were:
. . . contained in the Type Specification, TS-156,
from which the major items are: Maximum gross weight
2CH-53A Log Book maintained by Mr. E. A. Rossi, Configura-
tion Control Officer. Naval Coordinated Project Office (APC-255),






of 35,000 pounds, multi-engine, crew of three, all-
weather, compatible with Amphibious Assault Helicopter
Carriers, wheels type landing gear, power blade folding,
for transportation of cargo, equipment, and troops,
seats for thirty troops, rear ramp boarding, internal
cargo handling system, external cargo hook, 8000 pound
payload, 100 NM radius (8000 pounds out and 4000 pounds
back). Vmax of 160 kts. Vcruise of 150 kts, hover
ceiling OGE of 6000 feet and rate of climb of 100 feet
per minute, with one engine inoperative on hot day.
3
Due to the short period of time available (1962-1967)
for the needed introduction of the HH-X into service, it was
determined that it would have to be a development based on an
existing model because "... there was no time to R&D a new
4
one from start." The competition was therefore limited to
Sikorsky and Vertol who could base their designs, respectively,
on the S-64 crane helicopter and the Army HC-1B (new designa-
tion is H-47) Chinook. Almost by accident, this became an
example of parallel prototype development because some four
years earlier, Sikorsky had begun development of the S-64
5
through the use of Independent Research and Development Funds,






"The History of the CH-53 , " article based upon notes of
the Configuration Control Officer, and The CH-53A Log Book , and
prepared by Naval Coordinated Project Office (APC-255), Naval
Air Systems Command, Naval Material Command, Department of the
Navy (Washington, D.C., 1969), p. 6.
Statement by United Aircraft Corporation on Independent
Research and Development Funds for submission to the Committees
on Armed Forces, United States Senate, United States House of
Representatives, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., March, 1970, p. 12.
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2 April, 1962 Specific Operational Requirement
(SOR) number W14-06 (HH-X),
Assault Transport Helicopter
(Heavy) was issued— it was an
updated SOR from the original.
7 May, 1962 Proposals from two contractors
were received.
6
26 July, 1962 Chief, BNW, approved the results
of the Evaluation.
24 August, 1962 Winner of evaluation was announced
as Sikorsky.
The Sikorsky proposal was favored based partly on
technical aspects, "... there was much more confidence in
the Sikorsky design based on production and maintenance aspects,"
and mainly on the bid price. Sikorsky's winning bid was $15
million for R&D Engineering and four R&D helicopters plus
$94 million for 100 succeeding production helicopters; total
bid was $109 million. Vertol bid $35 million for R&D and
$125 million for production; total was $160 million.
7 February, 1963 Contract awarded for development
of the CH-53A.
The award to Sikorsky could not be made until this time
because some of the money had been withdrawn from the program
(reprogramming) . The Program Manager had only $10 million for
7
"When the procurement was publicized, Kaman expressed
a desire to bid, intending to base their design on the Fairey
•Rotodyne 1 for which they were licensee. They never bid
because they lost their license prior to submitting a bid,
"
"History of the CH-53A," p. 1.
7CH-53A Log Book, p. 2.
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the R&D portion. Over a six week span, Sikorsky reduced their
R&D bid from $15 million to $10 million and altered the number
of R&D aircraft from four to two. The company also agreed to
charge all primary tooling and engineering over the first
fifty-five production aircraft following the two R&D aircraft,
thus present funding requirements were transferred to the
future, when sufficient funds would be available as budgeted.
Sikorsky further agreed to remain one-half year ahead of current
production requirements on aircraft sets of components, enabling
BNW to be one-half year ahead with current funds. Production
options called for in the contract are shown in Table 5.
TABLE 5
PRODUCTION OPTIONS FOR FY 63 CH-53A CONTRACT
Option FY Lot Aircraft Quantity
1st 64 IH a 16
2nd 65 IV 24
3rd 66 V 40
4th 67 VI 24
a.
Lots I and II were for first two developmental
aircraft. Total aircraft to be produced amounted to 106
aircraft if all options were used.
This option was divided to compensate for the fifty-
five aircraft agreement: (a) 15 aircraft; (b) 25 aircraft.
Source: Negotiated Contract Number NOw 63-0150-f between
the Bureau of Naval Weapons, Washington, D.C. and the United
Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky Aircraft Division), Stratford,
Connecticut, 7 February, 1963, p. 15.
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The Firm-Fixed Price contract, signed in accordance with
company policy, as well as the news release and the previous
IR&D testimony, indicated that the tehnological capability of
the company was sufficient for most of the "technical
uncertainties" to have been resolved. The Sikorsky Division
was certainly in the position to meet one of DepSecDef Packard's
stated exceptions to fixed-price, total package procurement
procedures, "... where the contractor is willing to make a
firm-fixed price commitment for development and production,
8
and where he has the resources to be able to do so."
During the 1962-1963 period when the contract details
were being worked out, the Kennedy Administration had been in
office almost three years, PPBS was developing under the then
SecDef McNamara, and one Marine Helicopter squadron was
operating in South Viet Nam. The point here is that in
February, 1963, when the contract was signed, it was not
possible to plan for all of the contingencies that would arise
later that year or in the next few years. In November of 1963,
President Kennedy was assassinated and Vice President Johnson
assumed office— this was the political climate of the country
at the time. That year (1963) also saw the fall of South
See page 72, footnote 34
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Vietnamese President Diem and the actual beginning of a U.S.
9build up in that country.
CH-53 development continued without much in the way of
complications—unfortunately, it was not that way politically.
On August 2, 1964, the U.S. Destroyer Maddox was attacked by
North Vietnamese torpedo boats in the Gulf of Tonkin. Full
evaluation of all the facts relative to this attack and a
subsequent one on August 4, 1964, are beyond the scope of this
study; however, the rapid succession of events which followed
culminated in the unanimous passage in the Congress of the
Joint South East Asia Resolution on 7 August, 1964, more
commonly known as the "Tonkin Resolution. " This blanket
resolution gave the President the power to
. . . take all necessary measures to repel any armed
attack against the forces of the United States and to
prevent further agression . . . The U.S. is . . .
prepared, as the President determines, to take all
necessary steps, including use of American Forces,
to assist any member or protocol state (of SEATO)
requesting assistance in defense of its freedom. 10
Based upon the Resolution, a more rapid build up in
Viet Nam began after the Presidential election of 1964 and with
the build up came the increased requirement for more military
equipment—including helicopters. As a result of the increased
q
Chester L. Cooper, The Lost Crusade—
A
merica in Viet







military requirements, the CH-53A contract was reopened in 1965
and thirty-five more aircraft were ordered for FY 66 to cover
anticipated combat losses. Table 6 shows a revision of the
options (the first three had already been exercised) which
pushed Option 4 to become the FY 68 buy.
TABLE 6
REVISIONS TO PRODUCTION OPTIONS FOR
FY 63 CH-53A CONTRACT




20 by Apr 66 (FY 66)
9 remainina FY 66
6 by Sep 66 (FY 67)
68 24 None
Source The table constructed from Amendment of
Solicitation/Modification of Contract Number
NOw 63-0150~f and from a personal interview with
Mr. Kent Linkins, Supervisory Contract Negotiator
(Sikorsky and Overhaul & Repair) AirFrames
Purchasing Division, Naval Air Systems Command.
Funds for the additional helicopters came from the
Supplemental Budget Request for $700 million from President
Johnson— it was known as the Emergency Fund, South East Asia.
Of the $700 million, "... $180 million . . . will be used
for the procurement of aircraft and helicopters and for
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the procurement of additional spare parts and items of that
kind. ,,:L1
It is interesting to note that political activity was at
such a high pitch during this period that the Budget Request
was sent to the Congress on 4 May, 1965, and passed the House
12
the next day and the Senate the day after.
Activity, both political and military, had an effect on
the National Economy as shown in Table 7 by the increased DOD
Expenditures and employment in the aerospace industry.
The figures indicate that from a low employment point
in 1964, the influence of DOD PPB was beginning to make itself
known. This is most notable in FY 66 when the planning begun
in 1964, and the Budget Request for South East Asia (SEA) had
a material effect on the economy— GNP, DOD Expenditures and
Aerospace Employment all showed a significant rise. Without
going into too much statistical detail, the figures reflect a
build up after the May, 1965, Supplemental Request— a build up
which continued until 1969. The time "lag" which occurs from
U.S., Congress, Senate, Senator Stennis speaking for
the Emergency Fund, South East Asia, H.J.R. 447, 89th Cong.,
1st sess., 5 May, 1963, Congressional Record , 9492.
12
U.S., Congress, House and Senate, Tabulation of
Voting in House and Senate on Emergency Fund, South East
Asia, H.J.R. 447, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 5-6 May, 1965,
Congressional Record, 9 540-41. House: 408 yes, 7 no , 18
not voting. Senate: 88 yes, 3 no, 9 not voting.
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incident to reaction can be accounted for by the planning,
programming, and budgeting involved (it is about eighteen





GNP DOD Expenditures Aerospace Industry
CY (Billions) FY (Billions) Employment
63 $590.5 63 $49,9 73 446,000
64 632.4 64 50.786 434,000
65 684.9 65 47.098 458,000
66 747.6 66 55.181 560,000
67 793.5 67 68.315 610,000
Source: Aerospace Facts and Figures 1970
,
Aerospace
Industries of America, Inc.
,
published by
Aviation Week & Space Technology (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1970), Table 7 is a compilation of
figures from pp. 6, 10-11, and 84.
The situation which developed in 1964-1965 may not have
been completely foreseen by planners, or it was and the combat
attrition aspect may have been thought of as causing appropria-
tions problems in Congress, especially since the SEA military
effort in previous years was relatively small. In any event,
the timing was much better for a budget request when it followed
the Joint Resolution, and it in fact enabled the Marine Corps
to obtain a total of 141 CH-53A Helicopters once the modified
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contract was completed. It should be pointed out that the
planning which began after the Tonkin Incident in 1964 also
ordered a one-year speed up in deployment of the CH-53A's and
this was absorbed in the program without much difficulty
because of the earlier Sikorsky contract agreement to stay
one-half year ahead of current requirements.
A review of what took place in terms of CH-53A Develop-
ment indicates that in 1959 when planning pointed to a replace-
ment need for the CH-37C, some kind of acquisition process was
set in motion. It progressed through a programming phase
(FYDP 63-67) which established an aircraft total for the
Program Element to achieve its mission as a portion of the
overall Marine Corps Program Objective, and incorporated the
quantity into a contract. After contract changes concerning
R&D Engineering had been made, budgeting was able to provide the
prescribed amounts of funds to obtain the aircraft.
What began in 1959 as an ordinary acquisition rapidly
turned into a development and production race against time
because of the political (or external) factors present in the
November, 1963, to May, 1965, time frame.
In 1968, another FFP procurement contract was signed
13
by Sikorsky and NavAir for an additional 124 CH-53D's. These
1 Negotiated Contract Number NOOO19-68-C-0471 between the
Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, D.C. and the United
Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky Aircraft Division), Stratford,
Connecticut, 1968, p. 3.

86
CH-53D's were a later model with increased lift capability.
The planning, etc., for this contract, again figuring the
eighteen month lag, took place in 1966— a year after the build
up started and at the same time the 35 additional CH-53's were
ordered. The contract time frame was CY 69 to CY 71 with
production based upon the schedule in Table 8.
The production and delivery schedule is shown because
it indicates the company (Sikorsky) will have no CH-53 back-
orders as of January, 1971. Scheduled production was established
and was to continue based upon the expected attrition losses.
When losses were not as high as anticipated, the contract for
the CH-53D was considered to be the final buy of the helicopter
— this determination in 1969 was made at the peak of the SEA
Involvement, in terms of DOD Expenditures (see Table 9).
This year (1969) also saw the Nixon Administration take
office and initiate a descalation policy towards South Viet Nam
involvement— this is reflected in Table 9 by the reduced DOD
estimates for FY's 70 and 71 which were the first years to come
under the Administration control.
With the beginning of the reduction in Defense Spending
and resultant drop in production, the aerospace industry began
projecting production figures and relating these to employment
numbers. In the case of Sikorsky, the company projected that
their working force would go from a December, 1969, total of
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coincides with the production schedule in Table 8. The latest
CH-53D contract would be completed and a forthcoming contract
with NavAir for a minesweeping model (RH-53) would be in either
the FY 72 Budget, which would coincide nicely, or the FY 73
Budget, which would cause problems. The same was true of the
14West German and United Kingdom CH-53 contracts. What this
meant quite simply was that the company did not, and probably
would not, have work during CY 71 to remain operational (see
Table 8). Sikorsky would keep its key personnel and attempt
to stay in business until contracts for additional work could
be signed.
When the plight of the company became known at the local,
state and national level, pressure was brought to bear on DOD
and NavAir. Both Senators and the Governor of the State of
Connecticut conferred with DOD and NavAir to seek some kind of
15
solution. Any situation which occupied the personal attention
of so many high officials in dealing with DOD, especially when
they were all from the same state, bears some analysis. There
were three main factors to consider:
1. The fact that Sikorsky did not have any contracts
in CY 71 of any substantial degree meant it would be faced with
a financial crisis that might lead to shut-down.




2. In the event the company had to shut down, or even
reduce its working force substantially, because of no contracts,
the skill base and technology of a company that developed an
assault heavy helicopter in 1963 and had it flying in combat in
1966, would be lost. The fact that a prime contractor would
be out of business would make procurement of spare parts
difficult for the company's helicopter models in existence.
3. A slow-down or shut-down of the company would result
in an overall increase in local, state and national unemploy-
ment. This was probably the most important factor considered
by the officials who conferred with DOD and NavAir.
Some economic facts about the State of Connecticut will
bring the third factor in clearer focus. Connecticut has
ranked second behind California for the past five years in
16
terms of average employment in the aerospace industry. The
Hartford area is the third largest aerospace market area in
17
the country. These two facts, plus the state's ranking
of fourth throughout the country in terms of Military Prime
Contract Awards and Per Cent of U.S. Total, give an overview
to the position the state found itself in once Defense Spending
A 1 • A 18declined.
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The result of the pressure was reopening of the CH-53D
contract with the following changes:
1. A third year would be added to the production
period.
2. Third year production would include "sliding"
sixteen aircraft into that year, taking the production
period to December, 19 71 (and into the first half of
FY 72)
.
3. There would be no price per aircraft increase,
but DOD (NavAir) would pay Sikorsky between $7.5 to
$7.9 million for engineering and tooling expenses. The
amount was about equal to the overhead for the "stretched"
production period. 15
The Sikorsky situation is not unusual in the aerospace
industry. A review of the daily newspapers and weekly news
magazines seems to indicate that much of the economic and
unemployment problems in the country are due to a reduction in
Defense Spending from the FY 68 to FY 70 peak periods. Further
proof of this economic factor is that some of the hardest areas
hit in the form of unemployment were also the aerospace
industry leaders. Such states as California, Connecticut and
Washington have had unusually high unemployment percentages
since the reduction in force began.
To complicate the situation in yet another way, the
increased efforts mentioned in the previous chapters implied a
maximization of efficiency and effectiveness—meaning the
cutting of costs in all areas. A reduction in military forces




brings with it less spending and a glutted labor market that
is already overcrowded.
An example of the austerity that can result is the
following quote:
General : Funds must be programmed for flight hour
operations on an austere basis. Flight hour
programming, on which financial requirements are
predicted, must be projected on the basis of
realistic anticipation of actual accomplishments.
The above would sound reasonable for regular squadron
policy, however, it pertained to RDT&E aircraft.
Another example of external factors influencing aircraft
procurement is in the F-15 Development Contract award to
McDonnell-Douglas Corporation with an estimated production
option of 520 aircraft costing some six billion dollars. The
loser in the competition was North American Aviation which
was subsequently awarded the B-l Development Contract (B-52
replacement). Both companies in the competition could have
been hurt financially if they did not get the contract, for
this reason once the award was made to McDonnell-Douglas, it
was an anticipated fact that North American would get the B-l
Development Contract "... because they were in trouble and
needed a big contract."
?
Naval Air Systems Command Instruction (NAVAIRINST)
7110.2, "Funding Requirements for RDT&E Aircraft,"
22 April, 1970, p. 1.
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The F-15 example brings about another type of situation
in which the reported amount of the development contract may
re-stimulate economic activity in the geographical area of the
company—only to find that the amount of aircraft to actually
be produced is much less. This was the case with McDonnell-
Dougals and the F-15—only twenty aircraft are to be produced
21
at present. The question of pressure being applied (as in
the Sikorsky example) in order to maintain an economic or
employment level in an area seems to be not how much should
be applied, but rather in which of several areas should it
applied to do the most overall economic and employment good.
The question comes back to the original Sikorsky contract in
1963 which averted a layoff. If, instead of proceeding into
full-scale production, the acquisition process was turned back
to the Validation Phase, or even if funding was not available,
could pressure be brought to bear to revive a contract or else
generate another contract for economic stability in an
area? The recent SST experience appears to be the basis of a
resounding negative to the whole question— at least in the
present political climate.
21Statement of Mr. Philip N. Whittaker, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force ( Installations and Logistics) before
the Military Operations Subcommittee, Committee on Government
Operations, U.S., Congress, House of Representatives, Hearing
on Weapons System Acquisition, 91st Cong., 2nd sess.,
September, 1970, pp. 9-10.
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The above may argue subsidization of the aerospace
industry as an alternative. The time element in weapon system
development was shown in Figure 10 on page 49. It took almost
three years to develop the CH-53 and this was because of
previous research that had been conducted— it seems reasonable
to assume that the development period would have been much
longer if no earlier research had been done. In addition to
time, another consideration is the cost. Table 10 is a cost
breakdown for the CH-53A.
The cost breakdown in Table 10 could be considered small
in the aerospace industry when compared to F-4 or F-15 con-
tracts, however, for one company (Sikorsky), it was its prime
source of income—once that income declined or stopped, the
financial stability of the company was affected. The amounts
above are shown to identify some of the relative costs and to
also show the economy to scale that results once the tooling,
etc. , have been accomplished— the result is a substantial
investment, completely specialized for production of large
helicopters. Even in the case of the CH-53, it costs large
amounts of time and money to develop a weapon system to meet
the specifications that were set in the SOR in order to
accomplish the Program Element Mission. Though the time, money
and effort may have commercial spin-offs in such areas as
commercial aviation technology and state-of-the-art, the main

TABLE 10
COST BREAKDOWN OF THE FY 63 CH-53A CONTRACT
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ARTICLES AND SERVICES
Tests and Aircraft Kock-up
Lots I and II: Ibdel CII-53 @ $U 572 138 each
Contractor Support Items
Reconditioning and Modification (each item)
Technical Personnel Support (each item)
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3 31 U 328
2 071 h$$ $ 8 165 527
$15U 172 1U9
Note: This Cost Breakdowi includes only the original contract buy
options and not the additional 35 for South East Asia#
Source: Negotiated Contract Number NOw 63-0150-f between
the Bureau of Naval Weapons, Washington, D.C. and
the United Aircraft Corporation (Sikorsky Aircraft




direction at the time of the contract is for the company to
successfully complete what it contracted to do. Once this has
been accomplished, the contractor may find that he has no other
customers for his product. This may have been part of the
reason 83% of a group of 295 aerospace executives from the
500 largest U.S. manufacturing companies stated they were not
interested in seeking additional defense contracts. Many
(52%) said they were not seeking to become more heavily engaged
in defense work, while others (10%) cited the low profitability
22
of the industry. The figures in Table 11 would seem to bear
the latter statement out.
The average net profit after taxes as a percentage of
sales for the period cited in Table 11 is 2.85%.
The point to the discussion is that production,
engineering and tooling costs in a development such as the
CH-53 bring about a high degree of specialization and invest-
ment. As a result of the large investment, the time involved
in development, and the relative low rate of return on that
investment, competition within the industry demands even more
specialization. This specialization is of great importance
22
Based upon interviews conducted by ORC Caravan Surveys,
of Princeton, New Jersey, a division of Opinion Research Corpora-
tion, for the Aerospace Industries Association of America, Inc.
The interviews took place during the last half of October,
1970. Aerospace News Release, Washington, D.C., 1 December,
1970 (P. A. Release Number 70-46), pp. 1-2.
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and advantage during production, etc. , but when the contract
is reduced or discontinued, or even completed with no follow-on
— it is difficult to market a product such as an Assault
Helicopter or an all-weather fighter commercially. To make
matters worse, even if a customer were located, national
security might prohibit such sales.
TABLE 11
TAXES AND PROFITS—AEROSPACE INDUSTRIES
Net Fede.ral Taxes as a Net Profit after Taxes










Source: Aerospace Facts and Figures 19 70
,
Aerospace
Industries of America, Inc.
,
published by
Aviation Week & Space Technology (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. 97.
The Sikorsky company developed an assault heavy helicopter
that was operationally ready and in combat in three years. A
major reason for this was its IR&D of a similar type of heli-
copter some four to five years earlier. If this is what is
possible, while the company is functioning, what would be the
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relative cost, time and capability requirements to bring the
same development about if the company had to first be estab-
lished? Many would say it would cost more to establish,
organize, and assume a technological capability in a new company
than it would to subsidize a company and keep its capability on
a reduced but still operational scale— Sikorsky is one example
of this approach. A situation of this nature could be con-
sidered one definition of the "warm base concept." It would
be where it is imperative that the industry be kept opera-
tional to meet the needs of future requirements resulting from
changing service department Program Objectives and it would
be kept operational by means of subsidization.
Another approach along the same line would be that
"production" would take the form of overhauling operational
aircraft the company had produced. Overhaul work of this nature
is usually conducted at Naval Rework Facilities. In the case
of the Boeing-Vertol CH-46, when its contract was completed
with no follow-on, the company began overhauling small numbers
of CH-46' s to keep the facility operational.
Perhaps one of the biggest problems in terms of external
factors is that of the time lag. The lag could pertain to
engineering, development, or production— it takes time to
develop a complete weapon system. The concurrency method has
been tried and in many cases found to be the more expensive.
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It also received unfavorable comments from DepSecDef in
Chapter III. By concurrency is meant concurrent development
and production. One major problem with this approach is that,
"... inadequate analyses of the concurrency risks involved
result in over-optimistic estimates of both cost and
23
schedule." The present DOD policy of increased prototype
development vice contract definition appears to be effective,
but it also takes time and costs money—especially to the
competitive loser.
The effects of various external factors affecting the
procurement process have been discussed, these included:
1. Independent Research & Development that a company
may be able to accomplish.
2. Economic effects of defense spending on contractors.
3. Minimal investment return to aerospace contractors
and its effect on industry incentive for defense contracts.
4. National and international policies which can affect
the industry.
5. Political pressures which arise in defense con-
tracting.
23
"Control of Changes in Naval Weapon Systems
Acquisitions," a compenduim of factors affecting the need for
changes, and Navy Actions to minimize and control changes,
Headquarters, Naval Material Command, February, 1970, p. 3.
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6. The "warm base" concept as a means of maintaining
critical industrial capabilities.
All of the above in one form or another represent factors
that may or may not have been considered by DOD in the procure-
ment process.
Procurement of weapon systems may possibly be made
easier if a helicopter requirement, for instance, could go
from DCNO(Air) to NavAir and then to a Defense Industrial
Agency which would produce it. History has proved the error
of this approach. The Morrow Board in 19 25 examined the pros
and cons of such a situation and concluded that the government
was dependent upon private enterprise for the design and
manufacture of aircraft, and that these manufacturers should
be well-staffed and competent (presumably through government
assistance). The Board defended such areas as proprietary
24
rights and encouraged independent research:
The great lesson of World War I had been that better
weapons are more important than more weapons and that
the way to meet this demand is to rely on the incentive
offered private enterprise, not on the routine procedures
of government-operated arsenals. 25
" Claude Witze, "Private Enterprise and the Public
Interest," reprint of article from Air Force/Space Digest
The Magazine of Aerospace Power , Washington: Air Force






The question of independent versus government-owned
aerospace industries may be settled on the common ground of
subsidization, though here again, the same external factors
enumerated above will have to be considered.
This chapter has discussed factors which are outside
the control of the military procurement process system and its
supportive planning, programming, and budgeting. Its purpose
has been to show that for the procurement process to remain
effective and dynamic, both government and industry need to
constantly evaluate their ever-changing environment and





Three major areas affecting aircraft procurement have
been studied— PPBS— Contracting—External Factors. The objective
of the study has been to review the three areas and major
revisions to them to decide if the latter do indeed enable
procurement procedures to operate better.
The point was made in the Introduction that though
Defense funding has been reduced, it was still DOD ' s (and the
Navy's) responsibility to maintain national security by means
of an up-to-date weapon systems inventory— to successfully
accomplish continued acquisition within reduced funding meant
that the procurement process should adopt the most effective
and efficient procedures available to it.
PPBS revisions were studied in Chapter II with the above
thought in mind and four major changes to the system were
reviewed.
The first was the Strategic Guidance Memorandum (SGM)




Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Strategic Objectives Plan-I
(JCS JSOP-I) . The goal of the Strategic Guidance Memorandum
(SGM) was to provide current and completely coordinated strategy
guidance for the entire defense community. Once the strategic
guidance was determined, the second major system change was
implemented—Fiscal Guidance (FGM). The purpose of this
revision was to establish the fiscal constraints within which
strategy guidance was to be carried out and it necessarily led
to the third revision which was the Joint Force Memorandum
(JFM). This Memo was a JCS effort to accomodate its overall
plans and objectives (JSOP-II) to the published fiscal con-
straints. Once this was accomplished, the individual military
departments then developed their own Program Objectives (POM)
which were reviewed by SecDef as to applicability to the
Department objectives. Acceptance of Program Objectives by
means of the PDM enabled a more integrated and financially
responsible approach upon which better budgeting estimates
could be developed.
Procurement Contracting was next reviewed along with the
procurement process because revisions to the process affected
contract selection and rationale. Chapter III first listed
three of the more common contracts (FFP, FPI, and CPIF) and
discussed advantages and disadvantages of each. It then
considered the procurement process and pointed out two new
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developments upon which more effective program decision-making
could be based. These were the Development Concept Paper (DCP)
which objectively presented the service department's activities
in any program effort for which a SecDef decision was needed
in order to continue. The second was Defense Systems Acquisi-
tion Review Council (DSARC) which reviewed an acquisition
procedure at three critical stages in order to determine if
certain milestone decision points had been reached upon which
the acquisition could proceed without running into great
difficulty. The milestones were set after the Conceptual
Phase, Validation Phase, and Full-Scale to Production Phase.
A third development in weapon system acquisition and perhaps
the most important was the DepSecDef Memo on Acquisition
Policy Guidance which stressed risk assessment throughout and
clearly defined contracting guidelines based upon a more prac-
tical approach. Finally, the Memo addressed itself to the
area of practical trade-offs based upon evaluation of the risks
between engineering design and operating requirements. The
Memo in effect tied in all of the major areas of the acquisi-
tion process and established common guidelines for each. The
chapter then concluded with the rationale that brought about
the changes affecting procurement contracting.
Determination of external factors affecting procurement
was taken up next in Chapter IV and the method used was to
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follow a specific aircraft from development to deployment. It
was difficult to establish any revisions in this area because
DOD had no control over changes, instead the chapter presented
what actually happened as a guide upon which to base the
effectiveness of the two previous chapters.
PPBS was shown to have a definite influence upon the
acquisition process and the national economy once a military
build up was instituted. Contracting procedures were also
reviewed in the context of actual development to show how
flexible and helpful they can be. The chapter then illustrated
several factors ranging from the importance of Independent
Research & Development (IR&D) in a critical period to the
relatively small return on investment that exists in the
aerospace industry. Additional factors included the effect
National policies, economic policies, and political pressure
had on a procurement process. The chapter concluded with a
discussion of the "warm base" concept and some of the arguments
presently being considered in its behalf.
The overall conclusion arrived at in this study was
that the revisions or affects in each of the areas were a
reaction to past or present conditions. It was felt that the
direction and intent of the revisions was sound but that a
more in depth evaluation of each could not be fully recognized
at the present because of the relative newness of each. It
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takes time to evaluate a revision and most of those discussed
came about within the past two years, some even within the
past ten months. It is still too early to tell for instance,
what the total effect of the PPBS Revisions will be since the
Budget was submitted only four months ago. Another factor in
evaluation is what has gone before, and here the past is not
that much of a help because of the present de-escalation
taking place.
PPBS revisions were certainly a reaction to the practices
of the previous eight years in DOD. They were a reaction to a
centralized system that did not always allow for dissent or
communication of a contractive nature. The influx of a new
political administration and DOD appointees in 1969 were seen
as a major breakthrough in modernizing procurement procedures
and PPBS. The key to the entire PPBS revision was the
participative and involved climate that developed with the new
DOD staff. This was reflected in the form of new documents
which were added to PPBS—each one involved or affected the
entire system and attempted to make the PPBS Cycle more of a
practical application of good management than of a pragmatic
approach to a difficult and unwieldy situation. The very fact
that the Management Conference was called four months after
the appointees were in office is indication of the need to
revise and the importance the new appointees placed upon it.
Of all that was done to revise the Cycle, it is felt that the
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participative management approach will have the greatest and
most lasting effect. Having military departments set their
own objectives and insuring overall conformance to established
security requirements is difficult but not impossible—setting
individual department objectives from a centralized position
may be the more impossible situation.
Introduction of Fiscal Guidance early in any planning
process requires early decision-making and this is not easy.
It was introduced in PPBS as a necessary revision because of
the inordinate amount of time that was being spent preparing
budgets which exeeded limitations, requiring much additional
effort in establishing conformance. This revision, in the
form of the FGM, is felt to have the second most important
effect on PPBS. The other three memoranda are essentially
based upon the participative approach, yet fiscal guidance must
of necessity be more centralized if it is to accomplish its
purpose of allocating scarce resources. The setting of dollar
limits cannot be left to any group, especially if different
interests are involved. It must be authoritative, yet flexible,
and emanate from a single source— and it does in DOD.
To draw any conclusions in the area of revised contracting
procedures is to imply practicality. The approach taken by the
DepSecDef in both of his Memos is directed toward the use of
contracts and contracting procedures as a useful means of
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accomplishing a difficult undertaking, namely major weapon
system development. The implementation of such things as DCP
and DSARC appeared to be almost an obvious necessity because
of the practical logic that went into them. Even though the
DCP came into being much earlier, it is felt that with the
present DOD leadership, it would have come about eventually.
Probably the most important revision in procurement
contracting is in the Policy Guidance Memo, for it is here that
standards and guidelines are established which direct and place
direct responsibility in any procurement effort. It is felt
that by tieing in all of the major aspects of procurement
contracting into a policy statement and then requiring the
widest dissemination possible of this statement represents a
major change in DOD—one that will develop into a more
practical and effective way of acquiring weapon systems.
Finally . in the area of external factors, the conclusion
is that it is too dynamic at this period in time to evaluate,
but this appears to beg the question since nothing ever remains
static in the real world. The conclusion then is that both
private industry and government need to analyze and study
external factors much more than has been done. The warm base
concept is but one example, IR&D and return on investment are
others, yet they are all interrelated because even these three
can make or break a company and thus alter the country's defense
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posture potential. It is considered an absolute necessity that
a council similar to DSARC, be established which could begin
to analyze present defense-industry problems in a declining
DOD Budget, and seek some overall approaches to the problems.
The council would consist of DOD, industry and Presidential
Economic Advisors who might be able to establish "milestones"
in the national economy and define areas which must be met or
else positive action would be taken. If the aerospace industry
in the country falls below a certain number of prime contrac-
tors, there should be every effort made, including subsidiza-
tion, to re-establish the level. This is more easily said than
done, but it is felt that the decision to analyze external
factors affecting weapon system procurement and to take such
action as shall be deemed necessary is one of national
importance— the furor over the SST in the past year is
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